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In a turmoil of emotional distress and in fear of the outcome of
an already deteriorating pregnancy, she fled the marital home with
only her small son and a suitcase full of clothes. This woman's hus-
band had publicly and privately bullied, berated, belittled and
browbeat her throughout their marriage, but since she became
pregnant she feared that his campaign to keep her in a constant
state of emotional disequilibrium would also harm the child she
carried. Her husband controlled her by keeping a tight grasp on
the family finances providing her with meager spending money and
forcing her to produce receipts for every penny she spent. He pun-
ished her by taking her checks, credit cards and car keys. In front
of their child, he cursed and demeaned her until she was reduced
to tears. However, he never hit her in front of witnesses and the
few incidents of physical abuse were not recent.
When this woman escaped her marital home, she did so only to
protect her emotional stability and the health of her baby, which
she nonetheless lost shortly thereafter. She hoped that this drastic
step would cause her husband to recognize the need for change.
Instead, the husband filed for divorce claiming that she had de-
serted the marital home without cause. Though the court found
her justified in leaving and therefore innocent of desertion, it re-
fused to grant her a divorce on the grounds of cruelty, reasonable
apprehension of bodily harm, or constructive desertion. In short,
the court denied her a divorce on any fault grounds.
Under Virginia law, this couple must remain married until they
have lived separate and apart for at least one year, when they will
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qualify for a "no-fault" divorce.1 In the meantime, the husband,
who has vowed to give the wife nothing, has complete control of
the former marital home, the automobiles that are titled in his
name and the family business where the wife had been a part-time
employee. The wife was awarded a modest amount of temporary
spousal and child support. The husband noted an appeal which as-
sures him at least an additional year in control of the marital
property.
Unfortunately, this domestic scenario is not uncommon in Vir-
ginia. In most cases, the standard of proof required in fault di-
vorces based on cruelty, reasonable apprehension of bodily harm or
constructive desertion demands that severe physical abuse occur
within the marriage. Circuit courts are wary of awarding bed and
board divorce decrees2 on 'grounds other than extreme physical
cruelty because Virginia case law does not appear to support any
grounds short of this extremely high standard. Family law attor-
neys, as a result, are faced with the dilemma of either advising cli-
ents to remain in abusive situations until the abuse becomes ex-
treme, or risk the adverse financial consequences that may occur if
the spouse must wait for a no-fault divorce or if the spouse is
found guilty of desertion.
Section 20-95 of the Virginia Code states "[a] divorce from bed
and board may be decreed for cruelty, reasonable apprehension of
bodily hurt, willful desertion or abandonment."' Though the list of
grounds seems clear, court decisions consistently blur the syntacti-
cal boundaries of reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt. By so
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Rep. Vol. 1990). This section states that a divorce may
be decreed:
On the application of either party if and when the husband and wife have lived sepa-
rate and apart without any cohabitation and without interruption for one year. In any
case where the parties have entered into a separation agreement and there are no
minor children either born of the parties, born of either party and adopted by the
other or adopted by both parties, a divorce may be decreed on application if and
when the husband and wife have lived separately and apart without cohabitation and
without interruption for six months.
Id.
2. A bed and board divorce decree terminates most marital rights but does not permit
remarriage. It must be merged into a final divorce decree before one can remarry. See 6A
MIcHIE's JUR. Divorce & Alimony § 4 (1985).
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-95 (Repl. Vol. 1990). The Virginia Code also sets out the compara-
ble grounds for absolute divorce: "Where either party has been guilty of cruelty, caused
reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt, or willfully deserted or abandoned the other, such
divorce may be decreed to the innocent party after a period of one year from the date of
such act." Id. § 20-91(6).
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doing, courts have effectively abolished two of the three causes
from the statute. This article will first trace how the sort of abu-
sive behavior associated with reasonable apprehension of bodily
hurt has been reduced from a grounds for divorce to a mere justifi-
cation against a charge of desertion. Second, this article will
demonstrate how the courts have narrowed the evidence which
constitutes proof of cruelty to include only acts of severe physical
abuse. Finally, the article will outline a statutory remedy to the
dilemma in which spouses subjected to abusive behavior are placed
by a standard at odds with a contemporary view of family life.
II. PERMISSIBLE LEVELS OF ABUSE WITHIN MARRIAGE
At one time, the common law allowed a husband to impose
"moderate personal chastisement" on his wife.4 The concept that
there are permissible levels of abuse within a marriage is not con-
doned by modern society. Virginia case law, however, does not re-
flect the modern view toward spouse abuse.
A. Fruits of the Unwise Choice
"[C]ourts of justice do not pretend to furnish cures for all the
miseries of human life," wrote the Supreme Court of Virginia more
than a century ago in Latham v. Latham.5 This sentiment has
echoed through the decades. In 1926, the court repeated the caveat
in Butler v. Butler.' In 1958, a version appeared in Hoffecker v.
Hoffecker.7 In 1986, the Virginia Court of Appeals repeated it
twice for good measure in Zinkhan v. Zinkhan and in McLaugh-
lin v. McLaughlin.9 In over one hundred years, the words changed
very little:
Well.established principles governing the granting of a divorce for
fault hold that the law does not permit courts to sever marriage
bonds and to break up households merely because husband and
wife, through unruly tempers, lack of patience and uncongenial na-
4. See Stedman, Right of Husband to Chastise Wife, 3 Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 241, 241-42
(1917). The "moderate personal chastisement" rule applied in criminal battery cases, not in
divorce, and was repudiated before 1917. Id. The courts apparently never accepted the rule
that the husband could use a switch not thicker than his thumb. Id.
5. 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307, 321 (1878).
6. 145 Va. 85, 88, 133 S.E. 756, 757 (1926).
7. 200 Va. 119, 125-26, 104 S.E.2d 771, 776 (1958).
8. 2 Va. App. 200, 209, 342 S.E.2d 658, 663 (1986).
9. 2 Va. App. 463, 467, 346 S.E.2d 535, 537 (1986).
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tures, live unhappily together. It requires them to submit to the or-
dinary consequences of human infirmities and unwise selections, and
the misconduct which will form a good ground for legal separation
must be very serious and such as amounts to extreme cruelty, en-
tirely subversive of family relations, rendering the association
intolerable.'0
The question is whether the public policy of preserving the fam-
ily unit is well served by placing the liability for "unwise selec-
tions" in juxtaposition with a strict standard for "extreme cruelty"
which requires evidence of bodily hurt. The plain language of the
statute does not set the threshold of actual physical abuse but pro-
vides the court with an opportunity to grant a fault divorce to a
spouse who reasonably apprehends bodily harm before it actually
occurs.
B. Blurred Fault Standards
Inconsistency in Virginia's case law makes finding a clear stan-
dard of proof for any of the fault grounds for divorce difficult. Ju-
dicial decisions in divorce cases tend to be fact oriented and are
now decided by a three judge panel. Therefore inconsistency may
be unavoidable.
1. Violent Outbursts of Temper
In Graham v. Graham," the Supreme Court of Virginia found
that the "misconduct of [the husband] was serious. The cursing,
the abuse, the violent outbursts of temper, the physical assaults,
the destruction of furniture and his indifference constituted con-
duct subversive of the family relations."' 2 Moreover, the court
found the cumulative quality of the abuse significant: "[the hus-
band's actions] finally accumulated to the point where Mrs. Gra-
ham feared for her life, and was no longer physically or mentally
able to stand more."'" The court could not force Mrs. Graham to
forfeit "her right to all maintenance or support" by finding her
guilty of "desertion without justification,"'4 as Mr. Graham had
10. Zinkhan, 2 Va. App. at 209, 342 S.E.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
11. 210 Va. 608, 172 S.E.2d 724 (1970).
12. Id. at 616, 172 S.E.2d at 730.
13. Id.
14. Id. See generally Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 382, 219 S.E.2d 898 (1975) (spouse is free of
legal fault in breaking off cohabitation even though he or she cannot establish the other's
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charged. Where there was almost continuous discord, jealousy, ar-
guments, coarse and abusive language, violent outbursts of temper,
a spouse was deemed to have a right to abandon the marital home
without being accused of desertion. 15 The court refused however,
to find that the same behavior rose to a level justifying a divorce
due to cruelty and constructive desertion as Mrs. Graham
alleged. 6
Cases such as the often-cited Graham decision compel trial
courts to reduce reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt and even
mental cruelty from actual grounds for divorce to mere "justifica-
tion" for a marriage partner leaving the marital home. Since 1970,
Virginia courts have been willing to give only this limited recogni-
tion to the existence of reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt
within the plain language of both sections 20-91(6) and 20-95 of
the Code of Virginia as a justification to a charge of desertion.'7
2. Threats and Indirect Injury
"'I ought to kill you,'" said the husband in Brawand v. Bra-
wand, another example of the court's continued blurring of fault
grounds. 18 The wife had threatened to call the police after her hus-
band had disciplined their oldest son. Following this incident,
though still living in the same house, the couple gradually became
estranged. The wife had a separation agreement drawn up which
the husband rejected as unfair. One day while objecting to his
wife's talking on the telephone, the husband tore the telephone
from the wall and threw it to the floor with such force that the
receiver bounced back and struck the wife. Though she took two
weeks to leave after the telephone incident, she "asserted that she
conduct as grounds for fault divorce); Rowand v. Rowand, 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E.2d 149
(1974) (a single incident of cruelty is enough to free the spouse of legal fault even if it is not
grounds for fault divorce in itself).
15. Graham, 210 Va. at 616, 172 S.E.2d at 730.
16. Id.
17. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-91(6), -95 (Repl. Vol. 1990). Prior to the Graham decision, the
standard for justified leaving of the marital home, under the rule of Hoback v. Hoback, 208
Va. 432, 158 S.E.2d 113 (1967) was "conduct ... sufficient to establish a foundation of a
judicial proceeding for divorce." 208 Va. at 435-36, 158 S.E.2d at 116. In 1980, the court
limited the rule in Breschel v. Breschel, 221 Va. 208, 269 S.E.2d 363, (1980) to exclude
allegations of constructive desertion. "A spouse may not break off cohabitation and success-
fully claim constructive desertion unless the other's conduct is sufficient to establish a foun-
dation for a divorce proceeding." 221 Va. at 211, 269 S.E.2d at 365.
18. 1 Va. App. 305, 308, 338 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1986).
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was terrified."'19
The court was adamant that the evidence did not establish
grounds for the wife's request for a fault divorce. The court did
find the evidence of the husband's behavior adequate to defend the
wife from a charge of desertion. "Husband engaged in violent, ver-
bal outbursts and spoke language which reasonably could be inter-
preted as threatening. The cumulative effect of these incidents and
other marital strife provided her ample justification or excuse to
leave."20
3. Commands to "Get Out"
Demands that a spouse "get out" may constitute a defense to a
charge of desertion. In Rowand v. Rowand,2' the wife refused to
deposit her paycheck in a joint account held by her and her hus-
band after they had experienced financial difficulties. "The hus-
band told the wife: 'Well, if you're not going to put your check in,
then get out.' The husband telephoned the wife's parents, stating
he was 'kicking her out' and inquiring whether they had a place
she 'could sleep.'"22 The wife relented and gave the husband her
check. Less than a month later, the wife insisted on buying shoes
and clothing for herself and shoes and medicine for the child
before contributing to the joint account. The husband again told
the wife, "[w]ell, if that is the way you are going to be about it, get
out."2 This time, the wife left. Because there had been no wit-
nesses to corroborate the evidence, the husband's punctuation of
the remark by grabbing the wife's arm and throwing her toward
the front door was not considered. In Rowand, the Virginia Su-
preme Court found the wife was justified in leaving, but would not
find that she had established grounds for constructive desertion.24
C. Intolerability to What Degree?
Fleeing spouses may now offer evidence of intolerable conditions
in the marital home to justify the decision to break the marital
19. Id. at 310, 338 S.E.2d at 652.
20. Id.
21. 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E.2d 149 (1954).
22. Id. at 345, 210 S.E.2d at 150.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 346, 210 S.E.2d at 151.
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relationship.2 5 The same fleeing spouses, however, are unlikely to
be granted a divorce on grounds of the same intolerable conditions
no matter how much those conditions may -cause apprehension of
bodily hurt. The willingness of the courts to accept such suffering
as a defense to desertion in the form of "justification," has allowed
them to gloss over the fact that the "reasonable apprehension of
bodily hurt" grounds for divorce has effectively been written out of
the Code of Virginia.
1. Courts Second-Guess the Fleeing Spouse
To be justified in leaving, a fleeing spouse is forced to assess, at a
moment of great emotional turmoil, whether the abusive situation
in the marital home is sufficient to constitute apprehension of se-
vere physical harm. Regardless of the fleeing spouse's perspective,
the courts, in a calm moment months later, will second-guess the
fleeing spouse's assessment. If the court agrees with the fleeing
spouse that the situation in the marital home had deteriorated to
the point of imminent and serious physical danger, then the charge
of desertion is neutralized. If the court disagrees, the fleeing spouse
becomes the culprit and suffers the possible loss of marital rights.26
2. Abuse Not Contributing to Fear for Physical Safety
Reasonable apprehension of bodily harm, in its reduced status as
"justification" in defense of a charge of desertion, does not seem to
include circumstances that a fleeing spouse may consider merely
intolerable. These circumstances must directly contribute to fear
for physical safety.
25. In 1988, the Virginia Court of Appeals clearly stated the standard for abusive behav-
ior as a defense to desertion in Kerr v. Kerr, 6 Va. App. 620, 371 S.E.2d 30 (1988).
[A] party to a marriage may now, for reasons that do not constitute grounds for di-
vorce, terminate marital cohabitation without necessarily committing desertion.
. . . Although these cases express no fixed formula for determining when justifica-
tion exists, they recognize the underlying premise that leaving the marital home is
justified when a spouse's conduct creates conditions so intolerable that the other
spouse cannot reasonably be expected to remain in the home.
Id. at 624, 371 S.E.2d at 33.
26. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(E)(5) (Repl. Vol. 1990). This section states that the
circumstances of the marital breakdown is one factor to be considered in the equitable dis-
tribution of marital property. Id.
1991]
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a. Non-Participation in the Marriage
In Reid v. Reid, 7 the court found "Mrs. Reid bore the major
responsibility for raising the children," including one hyperactive
child, "and maintaining the home," while Dr. Reid worked day and
night throughout the marriage.2 Lack of intimacy, the husband's
excessive work habits, and his failure to assist in disciplining the
children, caused the slow deterioration of the nineteen year mar-
riage and resulted in Mrs. Reid's decision to leave. Dr. Reid's fail-
ure to "understand what his wife was trying to get through to
him"" was, in the commissioner's opinion, what caused her to
leave. Her claim of justification was denied by the Virginia Court
of Appeals and she was found to have deserted her husband.
b. Gradual Breakdown or Delay to Act
Nor have the Virginia courts been sympathetic to allegations of
gradual breakdown of a marriage. In the case of Sprott v. Sprott,30
the trial court found that "the separation resulted from a 'gradual
breakdown in their relationship' and that '[t] he blame for that sep-
aration rests with both parties but does not rise to the level of a
willful desertion.' ",' The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed and
found that the wife had built a "psychological wall" between her-
self and her husband. "After each perceived affront, she added an-
other brick to the wall. '3 2 The court thus exonerated the husband's
conduct and removed her defense to desertion.3
In McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,3 4 the time-frame of the abusive
behavior which finally drove the spouse from the marital home was
found to be significant. If the abusive behavior "occurred only dur-
ing an approximate thirty day period immediately prior to the
time she left the marital abode, 3 5 neither cruelty nor justification
could be found.
27. 7 Va. App. 553, 375 S.E.2d 533 (1989).
28. Id. at 558, 375 S.E.2d at 536.
29. Id. at 561, 375 S.E.2d at 538.
30. 233 Va. 238, 355 S.E.2d 881 (1987).
31. Id. at 240, 355 S.E.2d at 881.
32. Id. at 241, 355 S.E.2d at 882.
33. Id. at 242, 355 S.E.2d at 883.
34. 2 Va. App. 463, 346 S.E.2d 535 (1986).




In twenty jurisdictions, habitual drunkenness or drug abuse is an
independent ground for divorce. 36 In Virginia, however, leaving an
alcoholic spouse does not even provide a defensive justification. In
Seehorn v. Seehorn,37 the wife gave an ultimatum to her husband,
"'[e]ither stop drinking or I would leave and he chose to continue
drinking, so I did leave.' , Mrs. Seehorn's evidence of her hus-
band's excessive use of alcohol was not enough to protect her from
a charge of desertion and she lost her claim to alimony.
Even the mitigating evidence that the parties had entered a
written agreement which provided for temporary spousal support
and that they had lived apart for more than one year when she
filed for a "no-fault" divorce did not protect Mrs. Seehorn from
the cross-bill for desertion. The court "conclude[d] that the evi-
dence of excessive consumption of alcohol did not as a matter of
law render cohabitation unsafe by endangering life or health."'3 9
III. WHAT IS CRUELTY IN THE COMMONWEALTH?
In 1967, the Supreme Court of Virginia suggested that bodily
harm or the apprehension of bodily harm were not required ele-
ments in establishing cruelty. In Hoback v. Hoback, ° the court
wrote:
We have recognized that evidence of violence or apprehension of
bodily harm are not indispensable ingredients in divorce suits charg-
ing cruelty, and that mental anguish, repeated and unrelenting neg-
lect and humiliation may be visited upon an unoffending spouse in
such degree as to amount to cruelty in the sense the term is used in
the law of divorce.41
In 1986, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals in Zinkhan v.
36. See e.g., ARi. STAT. ANN. § 25.24.050 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-503 (1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 1 (1990); NEV. STAT. §
641A.310 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-2 (1990).
37. 7 Va. App. 375, 375 S.E.2d 7 (1988).
38. Id. at 379, 375 S.E.2d at 9.
39. Id. at 378-79, 375 S.E.2d at 8-9; see also Hoffecker v. Hoffecker, 200 Va. 119, 125, 104
S.E.2d 771, 775-77 (1958).
40. 208 Va. 432, 158 S.E.2d 113 (1967).
41. Id. at 436, 158 S.E.2d at 116; see also Baytop v. Baytop, 199 Va. 388, 392, 100 S.E.2d
14, 17 (1957); Bisel v. Bisel, 197 Va. 636, 90 S.E.2d 779 (1956).
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Zinkhan stated the standard for "cruelty" as misconduct "entirely
subversive of the family relations rendering the association intoler-
able. ' 42 Therefore, the century old 'standard, established in
Latham v. Latham43 "that what merely wounds the feelings with-
out actually being accompanied by bodily injury or actual menace
. .. does not amount to legal cruelty" 44 remains the only clear
standard for cruelty in the Commonwealth. For all practical pur-
poses, as a grounds for divorce, abusive behavior is subsumed into
a category requiring actual bodily hurt. Mental cruelty, in fact,
may not even rise to the level of a justification for fleeing the mari-
tal home.
A. Psychiatric Impact of Cruelty Overlooked
In Rexrode v. Rexrode,45 the court recounted testimony as to in-
cidents of a husband's behavior "which can best be characterized
as extreme rudeness toward [his] wife and her relatives. [She] was
humiliated and embarrassed by these incidents and consequently
found the marital home to be an increasingly difficult environment
in which to live."' 46 Although the court conceded Mrs. Rexrode was
humiliated by the rudeness, it discounted her distress as being
rooted in fear concerning how she would care for herself should her
marriage dissolve. 47 However, testimony of Mrs. Rexrode's psychia-
trist, under whose care she was placed during two weeks of hospi-
talization clearly tied her distress to the marriage. "[H]er main
problem seemed to be a feeling of hopelessness and being over-
whelmed in the marriage, that she described as being one in which
she seemed to be very much victimized and she had a feeling of
powerlessness . "48 Though the physician advised Mrs. Rexrode
not to resume her marital relations with her husband, the court
disregarded expert assessment of the relationship between the hus-
band's cruelty and her symptoms. Instead, the court determined
that the physician's "testimony is equivocal . . . and supports the
chancellor's conclusion that her emotional difficulties 'arose not
from anything that occurred during the marriage, but from her
42. 2 Va. App. 200, 209, 342 S.E.2d 658, 663 (1986).
43. 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 307 (1878).
44. Id. at 321.
45. 1 Va. App. 385, 339 S.E.2d 544 (1986).
46. Id. at 387-88, 339 S.E.2d at 546 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 389, 339 S.E.2d at 547.
48. Id. at 388, 339 S.E.2d at 546.
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fears concerning her ability to care for herself should she leave Mr.
Rexrode and suffer adverse legal consequences.' 49 The struggle
that Mrs. Rexrode faced in choosing between the economic secur-
ity which her husband provided and freedom from his abuse was
lost on the court.
B. Burden to Take Remedial Measures Placed on Victim
The Rexrode decision also placed the burden of taking remedial
measures on the victimized spouse. Citing Breschel v. Breschel,50
the court stated that using the principle of cruelty as a defense to
desertion requires that the victimized spouse show that "she has
unsuccessfully taken whatever reasonable measures that might
eliminate the danger without breaking off cohabitation." 51 Because
Mrs. Rexrode could show no "reasonable efforts" to abate the
source of the marital discord which forced her into a psychiatric
hospital, the court found her guilty of desertion and denied any
award of spousal support.52
Following the Rexrode decision, an attorney now takes a risk by
telling a client not to return home when a physician so advises un-
less there is evidence of severe physical cruelty. 'Consequently a
victimized spouse may be forced to choose between two unattrac-
tive alternatives: (1) the further deterioration of health or (2) the
adverse financial consequences which may befall a spouse found
guilty of desertion.
The unclear standards upon which the Rexrode court depended
are illustrated in Breschel v. Breschel,53 the 1980 case upon which
the Rexrode opinion was grounded. In Breschel, the wife suffered
from multiple sclerosis that had stabilized during the first year of
her marriage. Once her condition was stable, her husband brought
his seven-year-old son by a previous marriage into the household.
The child proved to be unmanageable and Mrs. Breschel's health
deteriorated. 54 She was not allowed to bring help into the house-
hold. When attempts to bring social welfare services into the situa-
tion failed, Mrs. Breschel left the marital home, "'going to her
49. Id. at 389, 339 S.E.2d at 547.
50. 221 Va. 208, 212, 269 S.E.2d 363, 366 (1980).
51. Rexrode, 1 Va. App. at 390, 339 S.E.2d at 547.
52. Id.
53. 221 Va. 208, 269 S.E.2d 363 (1980).
54. Id. at 209, 269 S.E.2d at 364.
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mother's until her health got better.' " The court took the evi-
dence of "significant deterioration of her physical condition," con-
firmed by her physician, along with evidence that she had sought
counseling and other assistance as enough to "compel a conclusion
that she was without legal fault in breaking off cohabitation."5 6 At-
tempting to determine whether a trial court will apply the
Breschel reasoning or the Rexrode reasoning is an extremely diffi-
cult call for a family law attorney to make.
The decision in DeMott v. DeMott,5" 7 suggests that even in-
flicting actual physical harm may not be enough to establish
grounds for divorce under cruelty or constructive desertion. The
Supreme Court of Virginia found that a single act of physical cru-
elty, by itself, was not enough to constitute grounds for divorce.58
When Mrs. DeMott criticized her husband for allowing their child
to go barefoot, he "became angry, grabbed her, threw her against
the wall, struck her and threatened her with a butcher knife." 59
Though the court termed the assault "reprehensible and unwar-
ranted," it dismissed the incident as not doing "her serious bodily
harm or caus[ing] her reasonable apprehension of serious danger in
the future." 60
IV. QUALITY OF FAMILY LIFE IN VIRGINIA
The standards required by the courts for what must be endured
in a marriage before a spouse is justified in seeking a divorce are
grounded in the law of an age pre-dating the heightened conscious-
ness over the plight of the dependent spouse. These standards
overlook several decades of research on family violence, spousal
abuse, stress and other scientific data now available to family law
decision-makers. Throughout society, major shifts have occurred in
perceptions of what is appropriate familial conduct. Yet, these
shifts are not reflected in Virginia's domestic relations case law.
55. Id. at 211, 269 S.E.2d at 365.
56. Id. at 212, 269 S.E.2d at 366.
57. 198 Va. 22, 92 S.E.2d 342 (1956).
58. Id. at 28, 92 S.E.2d at 346.
59. Id. at 27, 92 S.E.2d at 345.




The bizarre result of the judicial overlay on the Commonwealth's
statutory grounds for divorce can result in marriages which are
non-existent except on paper. No equitable distribution can take
place because no final divorce can occur until one year after the
couple's separation, when they will qualify for a no-fault divorce.6
In the meantime, it is conceivable that one spouse may have exclu-
sive use of the marital assets, often controlling the family residence
from which the dependent spouse fled. Further the spouse in con-
trol may have exclusive access to the financial resources which
were the family's sole support during the marriage. Such a combi-
nation of circumstances does not advance the public policy of pre-
serving the marital state.
B. Impact on Children
Virginia courts should address the implications on social policy
that are produced by forcing couples into a limbo where neither
can obtain a divorce by law. Often such a situation occurs where
the spouse has suffered from verbally abusive behavior and even
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm but is not found to have
experienced severe bodily harm. Consideration ought to be given to
situations where much of the abusive behavior takes place in the
presence of children. Sections 20-95 and 20-91(6) of the Code of
Virginia do not state who must suffer the required harm. 2
Studies of the behavioral development of abusive men reveal
that abusive behavior directed toward family members is a learned
behavior.6 3 While these studies deal specifically with physical
abuse, at least one researcher has suggested that the patterns of
learning are the same for verbal abuse. 4 A fine line exists between
the acted-out rage of a verbal abuser and the use of fists, feet or
61. If a property settlement has been achieved and there are no minor children, a divorce
may be decreed after a six month separation. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Repl. Vol.
1990).
62. Id. § 20-91(6), -95.
63. See generally Post, Willett, Franks, House & Back, Childhood Exposure to Violence
Among Victims and Perpetrators of Spouse Battering, 6 VIcTIMOLOGY 156 (1981). Cf.
Kurtz, The Effects of Victimization on the Acceptance of Aggression and the Expectations
of Assertive Traits in Children as Measured by the General Social Survey, 9 VICTIMOLOGY
166 (1984).
64. See Peltoniemi, Family Violence: Police House Calls in Helsinki, Finland in 1977, 5
VICTIMOLOoY 213, 213-14 (1980).
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instruments to express that same rage.6 5
Male children growing up in a household where an adult male
constantly uses abusive behavior to assert his dominance learn to
accept that behavior. Eventually, these male children equate such
abusive behavior with the appropriate role of an adult male.6 6 Fe-
male children learn the role of victim by seeing their mother vic-
timized. 7 Thus, the next generational link in what sociologists and
psychologists now called the "Cycle of Family Violence" is
forged.68
V. LEGISLATING A NEW STANDARD
The time has come for Virginia to lay aside the concept of fault
in divorce. The relevance of fault to any significant issue has been
greatly diminished by the 1982 adoption of equitable distribution
of marital property. Equitable distribution of marital property lists
fault grounds for divorce as merely one of many considerations.6"
Moreover in 1988, the General Assembly eliminated fault grounds
as a bar to an award of spousal support in all cases, except
adultery.70
A. Fault Loses Its Financial Impact
In that same year, in Aster v. Gross,71 the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals decided that in Virginia, only fault which has an economic
impact upon the family assets, such as spending family funds to
have adulterous affairs, had any relevance to property division. 72 In
Aster, the wife moved to introduce evidence that the husband had
committed adultery with seven different persons. 73 The husband
"conceded that he was at fault in the marriage's dissolution" and
that the wife was free of fault, but objected to evidence being in-
65. See R. GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME 25 (1987).
66. See Wolfe, Jaffe, Wilson & Zak, Multivariate Investigation of Children's Adjustment
to Family Violence, FAMILY ABUSE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 228-29 (1988).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3E(5) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
70. Id. § 20-107.1; see also Butler, Domestic Relations: Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
22 U. RICH. L. REV. 565, 568 (1988).
71. 7 Va. App. 1, 371 S.E.2d 833 (1988).




troduced concerning the extent of his wrongdoing.74 The court
held:
[A] court must consider all circumstances that led to the dissolution
of the marriage insofar as those circumstances are relevant to a
monetary award. Equitable distribution is predicated upon the phi-
losophy that marriage represents an economic partnership requiring
that upon dissolution each partner should receive a fair portion of
the property accumulated during the marriage .... Therefore, cir-
cumstances that affect the partnership's economic condition are fac-
tors that must be considered for purposes of our equitable distribu-
tion scheme. Circumstances that lead to the dissolution of the
marriage but have no effect upon marital property, its value, or oth-
erwise are not relevant to determining a monetary award, need not
be considered.75
The court concluded that the alleged "marital misconduct bore no
relation to the value of the parties' marital assets . . . .Fault in
the dissolution of the marriage represent[ed] only one of the fac-
tors listed in § 20-107.3 and should not be used to punish economi-
cally either of the parties to the marriage. '76
Thus, since it appears the issue of fault has lost most of its
power to alter the outcome of a divorce proceeding, one must ask
why the Commonwealth forces couples into the guessing game of
whether their circumstances constitute cruelty, reasonable appre-
hension of bodily hurt, desertion, or some hybrid of the three. The
rule in Virginia that evidence in a divorce suit must be corrobo-
rated by a third party merely induces litigating couples to draw
family members into the direct line of fire, especially children who
have witnessed and often been subjected to the abuse as well.
Critics have suggested that fault grounds in divorce actions pro-
tect the dependent spouse. 7 In Virginia, however, the current in-
consistent application of the fault grounds for bed and board di-
vorce imposes a serious hardship on spouses who flee the marital
home for reasons short of actual physical abuse. These dependent
spouses must choose between being cut off from their homes and
losing access to their marital property until they qualify for a di-
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 6, 371 S.E.2d at 836-37.
77. See, e.g., L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL & Eco-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
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vorce on the grounds of living separate and apart for one year or
waiting until the abusive conduct becomes severe enough to qualify
as cruelty. Even then, their evidence of such occurrences may be
found insufficient to justify their decisions.
B. Irretrievable Breakdown or Incompatibility
Thirty-three states have adopted some form of irretrievable
breakdown of the marriage or incompatibility. as grounds for di-
vorce. 78 Virginia should follow Oregon 7 and Rhode Island80 which
have abolished the entire concept of fault grounds in the dissolu-
tion of a marriage except in determinations of child custody. Fur-
thermore, South Dakota allows the court to continue a proceeding
if there appears to be a chance of reconciliation, but not for longer
than thirty days.8 ' New Hampshire maintains traditional fault
78. See H. CLARK, 2 THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATION IN THE U.S. § 14.6 at 37 (1988).
79. Title 11, Chapter 107 of the Oregon Code reads:
(1) The doctrines of fault and of in pari delicto are abolished in suits for the annul-
ment or dissolution of a marriage or for separation.
(2) The court shall not receive evidence of specific acts of misconduct, excepting
where child custody is an issue and such evidence is relevant to that issue or except-
ing at a hearing when the court finds such evidence necessary to prove irreconcilable
differences.
(3) In dividing, awarding and distributing the real and personal property (or both) of
the parties (or either of them) between the parties, or in making such property or any
of it subject to a trust, and in fixing the amount and duration of the contribution one
party is to make to the support of the other, the court shall not consider the fault, if
any, of either of the parties in causing grounds ,for the annulment or dissolution of
the marriage or for separation.
(4) Where satisfactory proof of grounds for the annulment or dissolution of a mar-
riage or for separation has been made, the court shall not award a decree to either
party but shall only decree the annulment or dissolution of the marriage or for
separation.
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.036 (1989).
80. Title 15, Chapter 5 of the General Laws of Rhode Island reads:
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed, irrespective of the fault of
either party, on the ground of irreconcilable differences which have caused the irre-
mediable breakdown of the marriage. In any pleading or hearing for divorce under
this section, allegations or evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper
and inadmissible except . . . where child custody is in issue and such evidence is
relevant to establish that parental custody would be detrimental to the child or at a
hearing where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish the existence
of irreconcilable differences. Upon hearing of an action for divorce under this section,
the acts of one party shall not negate the acts of the other nor bar the divorce decree.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1 (1989).
81. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-17.2 (Supp. 1990).
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grounds8 2 but adds the grounds of irreconcilable differences 83 as
does the state of Idaho.8
4
Virginia should follow these states and replace sections 20-91,
20-93, 20-94 and 20-95 of the Code of Virginia with the following
provision:
(1) A divorce from the bond of matrimony shall be decreed (a) irre-
spective of the fault of either party, on the ground of irreconcilable
differences which have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage and no reasonable prospect of reconciliation exists or (b)
where the parties have lived separate and apart without cohabita-
tion and without interruption for a period of twelve months and no
reasonable prospect of reconciliation exists.
(2) In any pleading or hearing for divorce under this section, allega-
tions or evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper
and inadmissible except (a) where child custody is in issue and such
evidence is relevant to establish that parental custody would be det-
rimental to the child or (b) at a hearing where it is determined by
the court to be necessary to establish the existence of irreconcilable
differences and the prospects of reconciliation.
(3) In an action for divorce under this section, the acts of one party
shall not negate the acts of the other nor bar the entry of a divorce
decree. The court may find that the marriage is irretrievably broken
even though one party claims it is not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Modern society recognizes injustice in requiring men, women
and children to be subjected to unruly tempers, lack of patience
82. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (1983).
83. Title 43, Chapter 458 of New Hampshire Revised Statutes reads:
A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed, irrespective of the fault of
either party, on the ground of irreconcilable differences which have caused the irre-
mediable breakdown of the marriage. In any pleading or hearing of a libel for divorce
under this section, allegations or evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be im-
proper and inadmissable [sic], except where child custody is in issue and such evi-
dence is relevant to establish that parental custody would be detrimental to the child
or at a hearing where it is determined by the court to be necessary to establish the
existence of irreconcilable differences. If, upon hearing of an action for divorce under
this section, both parties are found to have committed an act or acts which justify a
finding of irreconcilable differences, a divorce shall be decreed and the acts of one
party shall not negate the acts of the other nor bar the divorce decree.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-a (1983).
84. IDAHO CODE § 32-603 (1983).
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and uncongenial natures. Modern society recognizes injustice in
forcing spouses to submit to the ordinary consequences of human
infirmities and unwise selections. Injustice, too, is found in holding
back the grounds for divorce unless the cruelty is so extreme that
it is entirely subversive of family relations, rendering the associa-
tion intolerable. Yet these are the tests by which broken marriages
in Virginia are now measured. Waiting until the cruelty becomes so
extreme as to be subversive of family relations does not preserve
the family unit as was once believed. When the legitimate objects
of matrimony have been destroyed, for whatever reason, public
policy is not served by a divorce denied.
